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v. Ohio was the path·breaking
Supreme Court decision in 1961 that directed state courts to exclude from criminal trials any evidence obtained by state
police through unlawful searches and
seizures. It was the beginning of the Warren Court's "revolution" in criminal procedure, an effort to bring American law
enforcement practices into line with constitutional standards. Today, with the
Warren Court's approach to criminal justice under wide attack from conservatives, the Burger-Court majority is
gearing up to reconsider and possibly
overrule Mapp's exclusionary evidence
rule. The Chief Justice himself has deplored what he says is the "high price"
that the Mapp rule "extracts from society-the release of countless guilty
criminals." Several other conservatives
on the Court have hinted that they arealso ready to allow the states to decide
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whether they will admit illegally obtained evidence.
As lawyers prepare for this return encounter in the Supreme Court, there is a
piece of experience in Minnesota that is
worth bringing forward, especially since
it happens to involve our new Vice President, Walter "Fritz" Mondale.
Before the Mapp case, Minnesota was
like New York and twenty other states
that allowed illegally obtained evidence
in their state criminal proceedings. Some
months after the Mapp decision, when
Minneapolis appeared to be in the grip of
a "burglary wave," the local police
blamed the "new" restrictions of the
Mapp rule. "I'd have 20 guys in jail right
now," the head of the city detective bureau lamented, "if we didn't have to operate under present search and seizure
laws."
Similarly, when the State Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension conducted a series of police institutes in 1962 to teach
law enforcement officers the law of arrest, search, and seizure, there was much
complaint about Mapp. The instructors
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seemed more interested in telling the police how to get around the requirements
of obtaining arrest or search warrants
than they were in teaching police how to
comply with the Fourth Amendment's requirements in their daily operations.
The police backlash against the Mapp
ruling strongly disturbed Minnesota's Attorney General, Fritz Mondale, then a
new office-holder, and just five years out
of law school. He decided to make the
principal address at the next state police
institute, and to use the occasion for some
straight talk to law enforcers.
"The language of the Fourth Amendment," he reminded them, "is identical to
the [search and seizure clause] of the Minnesota State Constitution." No one could
properly maintain, therefore, that a higher constitutional standard had been imposed "by the Warren Court than the
state itself declared necessary to protect
the individual's right to privacy and to
regulate how government carried out its
search and seizure activities."
Furthermore, Mondale noted, "the
adoption of the so-called 'exclusionary
rules' does not affect authorized police
practices in any way. What was a legal ar-

rest before, still is. What was a reasonable search before, still is." In short, "the
Mapp case does not reduce police powers
one iota. It only reduces potential abuses
of power."
Mondale went on to declare that "the
very fact that these institutes are being
held is eloquent testimony, it seems to
me, of the basic wisdom of the Court's decision. We are doing today ... what we
should have done all along. We are studying ways in which we can bring our police methods and procedures into harmony with the constitutional rights of the
people we serve."
Then Mondale dealt directly with the
way that many law enforcement officials,
in Minnesota and elsewhere, had reacted
to the Mapp decision: "For those who seek
techniques to circumvent the constitutional rights of the people, I say that it is
not only illegal, but contrary to our oath
and destructive of a free society to do so.
As attorney general of this state, I do not
propose to permit our Constitution to be
circumvented and I serve notice upon
anyone so inclined."

Attorney General Mondale was absolutely right in his presentation of what
the Mapp case had said. If the Minneapolis police facing a rash of burglaries in
1962 had reasonable grounds to believe
that a particular "twenty guys" had done
those crimes, they could still have arrested them. If, on the other hand, the police only had vague suspicions and lacked
reasonable grounds for detaining those
suspects, it was not the Mapp ruling but
long-standing commands of both the
United States and the Minnesota constitutions that precluded them from making
those arrests. The police had never had
the legal authority to violate those constitutional rules, only the incentive to do so
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at will, knowing they would not be reprimanded, punished, or have their prosecutions impaired because of such illegal
conduct.
Attorney General Mondale's point that
police had been violating Fourth Amendment and state constitutional rules all
along did not sit well with local law
enforcement officials. At an ACLU conference in 1963, the Minneapolis city
attorney denied that police had been violating the law; his explanation was that "the
courts of our state were telling the police
all along that the [exclusionary evidence
rule] didn't apply in Minnesota." This peculiar way of reading what was illegal, as
opposed to the evidentiary consequences
of police illegality, was echoed by a St.
Paul detective in his remarks at the same
ACLU panel. "No officer lied upon the
witness stand," Detective Ken Anderson
explained. "If you were asked how you
got your evidence, you told the truth.
You had broken down a door or pried a
window open .... Oftentimes, we picked
locks." The police did these things, the
detective noted, because "The Supreme
Court of Minnesota sustained this time
after time. [The] judiciary okayed it; they
knew what the facts were."
Now that the Mapp decision is being reconsidered by the Supreme Court and

the American public is trying to reconsider how to conduct its criminal justice system, the key points Fritz Mondale made
fifteen years ago deserve to be the starting
place for our thinking. It was not until
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary evidence rule in 1961 that
most police recognized the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment and its state
counterparts as binding rules upon their
conduct. Mapp generated serious discussions about how to develop lawful arrest, search, and seizure practices into the
training sessions and police manuals of
American law enforcement in a way that
had rarely occurred before.
Any judicial reversal of the Mapp rule
threatens to have just the opposite effect.
Law enforcement officials are likely to
treat a decision that illegally obtained evidence may be admitted into state criminal trials as though that were a practical
suspension of the constitutional rules as
to lawful arrest, search, and seizure.
They are likely to feel that once again
"the judiciary is okaying it." With the
smell of revelations of FBI "black-bag
jobs" and intelligence agency abuses still
in the air, is this how we want the Court
to contribute to the atmosphere of police
practices as we enter our third century as
a nation?
e
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